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Abstract
Foreclosure properties sold at Japanese judicial auctions are delivered to buyers with
an unclear title when occupants exist, because the foreclosure laws protect occupants from
compulsory execution of auctions. The existence of occupants theoretically a¤ects the auction
price through two channels. First, it a¤ects the reserve price, and this changes in auction
price. Second, the number of bidders changes in response to changes in the reserve price that
is controlled by occupants, and this changes the auction price. Using data from the Osaka
District Court, we empirically nd that the existence of occupants in properties reduces the
auction price through two channels.
JEL classication: D44, K19, R31
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1 Introduction
The Japanese economy experienced a decade of economic stagnation in the 1990s. Because the
loss in value of real estate was substantial, Japanese nancial institutions found that the property
taken as collateral was not enough to fully recover their loans. Creditors listed their foreclosure
properties at a judicial auction to recover part of their loans by selling o¤ the collateral. Their
prompt sales in the auctions should have reactivated the real estate market and contributed to
a recovery from the long depression. Regrettably, however, the existence of costly occupants
protected by the foreclosure laws has been working as a brake to these desirable changes.1 The
purpose of this paper is to examine how these costly occupants a¤ect the auction price formation
using data from the Osaka district court.
Allen and Swisher (2000) show that real estate properties sold in auctions appear to sell at
a signicant discount relative to predicted market values, using the data from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) auctions in Florida. One of the reasons is that
troubled nancial institutions try to quickly dispose of large amounts of distressed real estate.2
Hence, buying real estate properties through the auction is attractive to prospective buyers.
Nevertheless, public buyers were very few and the auction was limited to professional realtors
in Japan. As a result, real estate properties sold in the auction fell further in value. Why did
public buyers hesitate in participating in the auction market in Japan? The main reason is a
di¤erence in the treatment of the property title between the US and Japan. According to Allen
and Swisher (2000), foreclosure properties sold at HUD auctions are delivered to the buyer with
a clear title. All liens and other encumbrances of record are eliminated through the foreclosure
process before HUD accepts title. In contrast, titles in Japan are unreliable because of costly
occupants. That is, leaseholders in foreclosure properties are strictly protected by the foreclosure
laws.
1Tomura (2007) presents a dynamic general economic equilibrium model that captures endogenous uctuations
in total factor productivity (TFP) in response to credit market shocks. In his model, TFP is dened as the average
productivity of land. He shows that restrictions on liquidating collateral assets under the foreclosure laws caused
negative credit market shocks and an endogenous fall in the TFP growth rate in Japan in the 1990s.
2Mayer (1998) also shows real estate properties sold in auctions appear to sell at a discount relative to negotiated
sales. His results are consistent with the theoretical prediction of his earlier work (Mayer 1995) that the auction
discount increases in downturns when a seller trades o¤ a longer expected selling time in a search market against
an immediate auction sale.
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There are two types of leasehold: short-term leasehold and long-term leasehold, although the
former was abolished in 2003. Short-term leasehold is formed by contract after the mortgage is
registered, while long-term leasehold is formed beforehand.3 The foreclosure laws before 2003
protected occupants with a short-term leasehold in the following way. First, the civil law stated
that a lease contract prevails over a mortgage agreement, even if the lease was signed after
the mortgage was registered. Therefore, if a foreclosed building with short-term leasehold was
rented, it was di¢ cult to evict the tenant. Secondly, the civil execution law stated that it is
necessary to identify an occupant to enforce compulsory execution of an auction. The original
purpose of these laws related to foreclosure was to protect the interests of occupants, who
were considered to be in a weak position. These laws, however, produced harmful side e¤ects.
Faced with an impending foreclosure, a debtor or a creditor with a lower mortgage order could
quickly arrange a lease to obstruct the compulsory seizure of property by a creditor with a prior
mortgage order. Pretending to be a benign third party, some tenants approached a creditor with
a prior mortgage order or a successful bidder, o¤ered an early evacuation and demanded a large
compensation for leaving the property. Such an occupant was called a professional occupant,
often having links to an organized crime syndicate. In 2003, both the civil law and the civil
execution law related to short-term leasehold were dramatically relaxed because of this harmful
side e¤ect. Foreclosure properties with long-term leasehold are still protected by the foreclosure
laws. As mentioned above, a lease contract prevails over a mortgage agreement under civil law.
Vendees of a foreclosure property have to continue leasing it. That is, it is almost impossible
to cancel a lease contract if occupants want to continue residing in foreclosure properties. In
order for vendees to terminate the contract despite the occupantsdesire for renewal they must
approach a court and prove just cause. However, what constitutes a just cause is not shown
clearly.
In recent studies, the variable for the current types of occupancy has been important. Using
data from real estate auctions in Singapore, Ong, Lusht and Mak (2007) use the possession of
vacant properties, but it is not signicantly associated with the probability of sale. They argue
3Note that the so-called short-term leasehold and long-term leasehold do not depend on the time horizon.
Instead, they depend on the timing of lease inception and settlement of mortgage.
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that this is because vacant possession may be completely captured in prices paid. Alternatively,
it may be because it is costless to remove occupants in Singapore. Saita (2003) provides the
most closely related study to our work. She uses an hedonic analysis to estimate judicial auction
prices associated with distress properties in Tokyo, for the period 19922002. She uses a current
use dummy variable that takes the value one when a tenant occupies a dwelling, and directly
measures the e¤ect of the tenure status of the property on the auction price. As expected, the
dummy variable has a statistically negative and signicant impact on the auction price.
Our empirical model is based on auction theory. Similar to Ooi, Sirmans and Turnbull
(2006), we present a sealed-bid private model corresponding to the Japanese judicial auction
system. The model shows that the tenure status of the property a¤ects the resultant auction
price through two channels. First, the tenure status of the property a¤ects the reserve price, and
this changes the auction price. Second, the number of bidders changes in response to changes
in the reserve price that is controlled by the tenure status, and this changes the auction price.
It is commonly said that a court considers the risk of a costly tenant to the success of selling
distressed properties. Therefore, we assume that the reserve price depends on the tenure status.
We use data of the auctions under the jurisdiction of the Osaka District Court for the period
19972004. The court made available documents including information of foreclosure properties.
In contrast to Saita (2003), our empirical model indirectly measures the tenure status of the
property through the two channels mentioned above. Our estimation model is formed by three
equations, the reserve price, the number of bidders, and the auction price. There is information
in the courts documents that is di¢ cult to express numerically. The reserve price may be
inuenced by these omitted variables which are also associated with both the number of bidders
and the auction price. To address this concern, we use generalized method of moments (GMM).
The empirical results show that the existence of occupants in foreclosure properties reduces the
auction price by reducing the reserve price. The existence of occupants further reduces the
auction price by decreasing the number of bidders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the process
of judicial foreclosure in Japan. In Section 3, a theoretical model is presented. The data and
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empirical model used are discussed in Section 4, along with the empirical results. Section 5
summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The Judicial Foreclosure Process
In the 1990s, real estate auctions under court jurisdiction were used to dispose of property
involved in foreclosure or bankruptcy. Japanese sealed-bid auctions proceed as follows: rst,
the district court announces an impending auction, and determines the period, normally longer
than a week and shorter than a month, in which the buyers send their bids. An appraisers
valuation is open to the public in advance, called a minimum price, and this forms the basis for
the bidderssubmitted prices, as the bid prices must be higher than this minimum. The court
lets the potential buyers examine documents containing details of the property, including size,
location, and quality, as well as the appraisers report, the names of occupants and tenants if
there are any, and the renting contract that the buyer must inherit.
Second, the court starts accepting the bids. A bidder must pay a deposit equivalent to 20%
of the minimum price. No bidders know how much others bid. Nor can the bidder change the
bid price once the bid is submitted. The court closes the process and announces who bid the
highest price. In the third step, the winner pays the price and registers the estate as his or
her property, and the property is delivered to the new owner. In contrast to HUD real estate
auctions in Florida (Allen and Swisher 2000), the new owner must evict occupants, if any, at
his or her own cost even if they are not protected by law.
Accumulated bad loans in the late 1990s encouraged the liquidation of the collateral real es-
tate by improving the auction procedure. Therefore, the foreclosure laws in Japan were amended
to ensure the prompt execution of auctions in 1998 in various ways. Mortgageesbanks and other
nancial institutions typically also initiate auctions in Japan but they cannot inuence the min-
imum price. Before the amendment, minimum prices did not change even if properties failed
to sell. The new procedure requires minimum prices to be determined by considering the state
of the real estate market and the particular circumstances of the property. If properties fail to
sell, the court can lower the minimum price mechanically, by 30%, for example. Bidders are
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able to arrange loans with banks or other nancial institutions by setting the property to be
auctioned as collateral. In these ways, the 1998 amendments of the foreclosure laws greatly
improved Japanese real estate auctions. Although land prices in the general market continued
to decrease substantially, by 4.15% before and 6.04% after the amendment, the average number
of bidders increased from 4.67 to 8.15 persons in the Osaka area. The average period starting
from the foreclosure to the successful auction decreased by almost half; from 560 before to 276
days after the amendment.
However, both the civil law and the civil execution law related to short-term leasehold,
which protected occupants and produced problems of execution obstruction for auctions, were
not amended until 2003. Moreover, the civil law still protects occupants related to long-term
leasehold.
3 The Model
The purpose of this section is to link the observable characteristics of winning bidders and
properties to the observed auction prices in our empirical study. Similar to Ooi, Sirmans and
Turnbull (2006), we use a model of a rst-price sealed-bid auction with symmetric independent
private values corresponding to the Japanese judicial auction. Consider a judicial auction of a
property k. There is a reserve price (minimum sale price) rk, which is determined by a court:
rk = r(hk; tk); (1)
where hk is a vector of housing traits, and tk are dummy variables for the tenure status of the
property.4
Assume that there are Nk potential bidders in the auction for the property k. Their private
value of the property k depends on their own valuation i, and the reserve price rk, which
includes public information on property k:
vik = v(i; rk):
4We do not consider the optimal strategy of a seller (court). In contrast, McAfee, Quan and Vincent (2002)
show the optimal reserve price using the common-value model, and then empirically test the real estate auction
data.
6
For simplicity, assume that the functional form is specied by:
vik = irk;
where irk is drawn from the distribution F which has support [0; rk]. This equation implies
that a bidder i estimates their private valuation of the property k, using public information on
the reserve price rk. All biddersvaluations increase when rk increases. Bidders consider the
private value of the other bidders as random realizations from F .
Only those participants whose private value is not less than rk (i.e., i  1) decide to
participate. Therefore, all bidders know the actual number of bidders:
nk = Nk
Z rk
rk
dF (v): (2)
Thus, the number of bidders is associated with the reserve price. The e¤ect of the reserve price
on the number of bidders is indeterminate because both the lower limit and upper limit change
in response to rk changes.
The equilibrium is a symmetric BayesianNash equilibrium. For a given rk from Eq. (1) and
nk from Eq. (2), we obtain the well-known optimal bidding function for bidder i:
bik = vik  
Z vik
rk

F (x)
F (vik)
nk 1
dx: (3)
Therefore, the bidding price depends on the reserve price and the number of bidders (see, e.g.,
Quan 1994).
Figure 1 reveals that there are two ways in which the current tenure status a¤ects the bidding
price. Firstly, the tenure status of the property a¤ects the reserve price from Eq. (1), and this
changes the bidding price from Eq. (3). We call this e¤ect the rst e¤ect. Secondly, the number
of bidders changes in response to changes in the reserve price through Eq. (2), and this changes
the bidding price from Eq. (3). We call this e¤ect the second e¤ect.
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4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 The Data and the Econometric Model
The auction of property takes place in each area under the jurisdiction of a district court in Japan.
We use data of auctions under the jurisdiction of the Osaka District Court for the period 1997
2004. Osaka has the second largest economy in Japan. We concentrate on data for Osaka rather
than that for Tokyo, because a private company makes the information available in an electronic
database only for Osaka. The court carried out 223 auctions, and the total number of properties
is 33,222. The sample we used in the analysis is as follows. First, we dropped observations
outside Osaka City, where Osaka City is the seat of the Osaka prefecture. Second, we used only
the sample of residential condominiums, excluding detached houses, nonresidential housing,
o¢ ces, shops, and warehouses. Third, we dropped the sample of condominiums that failed to
sell in both initial and subsequent auctions.5 Fourth, we dropped the sample of condominiums
sold by bulk sale, because we cannot allocate a price to each condominium. Lastly, we dropped
all observations for which all of the necessary information is not available. Screening the data in
this manner, we obtained a sample of 3251 observations of condominiums that sold in auctions.
Our estimated model involves three equations as in Figure 1. Table 1 presents the denitions
and Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical model. First,
a hedonic approach is employed to investigate the reserve price. The most important variable
that we focus on is the tenure status of the property. The types of occupancy are classied into
four di¤erent categories: short-term leasehold, long-term leasehold, third-party occupancy, and
vacant (reference category). Both short-term leasehold and long-term leasehold have previous
rights and obligations still attached to the property.6 Short-term leasehold is formed by contract
after the mortgage is registered, while the long-term leasehold is formed before. The short-term
leasehold expires in three years, so that the new owner must wait three years at most to obtain
full rights to the property. With long-term leasehold it is harder to obtain full rights, because
it is almost impossible to cancel a long-term leasehold if tenants want to continue residing in
5Toda, Nozdrina and Maddala (1998) estimated the auction price of apartments in Moscow. They estimated
a hedonic function by maximum likelihood using data of apartments not actually sold.
6The foreclosure laws of Japan were amended in 2003 as mentioned in Section 2, and enforcement commenced
on April 1, 2004. Therefore the data set in 2004 includes the properties with short-term leasehold.
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foreclosure properties under the civil law of Japan. Therefore, it is time consuming and costly to
evict tenants associated with short-term leasehold or long-term leasehold, and consequently the
reserve price of these properties will be lower than vacant properties. As short-term leasehold
expires in three years, the cost and time to evict tenants might be lower than long-term leasehold.
Third-party occupancy properties have pre-auction rights and obligations that are either not
clear or still attached to the property. A reserve price of this type will also be lower than that
of vacant properties because of ambiguity of occupancy. In fact, Table 3 shows that the reserve
price of both leasehold auction properties and third-party occupancy properties are lower than
vacant properties on average.
Other control variables that capture features of the Japanese judicial auctions are Delin-
quency and Failure. Delinquency is the amount of delinquency of administration costs of a
mortgagor, such as common area maintenance fees, water expenses, etc. A winning bidder must
take care of this delinquency instead of the mortgagor. The expected sign of Delinquency is
negative. Failure represents the number of times that a property fails to sell at auction. As
mentioned in Section 2, from 1998 onwards, the court lowered the reserve price if properties
failed to sell. Therefore, we use two dummy variables: Failure before and Failure after.7 We
expect that the negative sign of Failure after will be smaller than Failure before. To estimate
the reserve price we also incorporate hedonic characteristics, including the construction mater-
ial, number of oors in the condominium, size, age of building, location, and the time dummy
variables.
Second, we estimate the number of bidders who are controlled by the reserve price. We also
control general market conditions by introducing the assessed land value. Because the land value
and the potential number of bidders might have a positive correlation, the former might be a
proxy for the latter. Furthermore, we include time dummy variables. These will capture the
e¤ect of legal amendments after 1998. Table 3 shows that the number of bidders of short-term
leasehold auction properties and third-party occupancy properties is smaller than the number
of vacant properties on average. However, the number of bidders of long-term leasehold auction
7The 1998 amendments of the foreclosure laws enforcement commenced on December 12, 1998. Therefore
auctions in 1997 and 1998 are included in Failure before.
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properties is larger.
Third, the auction price incorporates the reserve price and the number of bidders is estimated.
We also control the assessed value of land and characteristics of the winning bidder. Similar to
Ooi, Sirmans and Turnbull (2006), we do not have observations on individual bids; instead we
have data for the winning bid and a few characteristics of the winning bidder. For characteristics
of the winning bidder, we include a dummy variable that takes the value one when joint-stock
corporations are the highest bidder. Individual bidders are the reference category. Joint-stock
corporations that include real-estate brokers usually resell foreclosure properties to prospective
buyers. They make a prot on each unit equal to the di¤erence between their bid price and
prospective buyersbid price. It is commonly said that individual buyers also aim to participate
in the judicial auction for the same reason as corporations. Therefore, individual buyers might
be related to professional realtors. Similar to the reserve price, Table 3 reveals that the auction
price of vacant properties is the highest.
As mentioned above, our estimation model is formed by three equations: the reserve price,
the number of bidders and the auction price. The model is determined sequentially. We use
GMM because it overcomes the correlation among error terms present for the following reason.
There is information in the courts documents that is di¢ cult to express numerically. The
reserve price may be associated with these omitted valuables that are also associated with both
the number of bidders and the auction price. Note that in the estimation stage, we use a natural
logarithmic transformation of all variables, except the dummy variables.
4.2 Estimation Results
Table 4 provides the estimation results of the reserve price. Before discussing the e¤ect of
occupants on the reserve price, we briey consider another control variable. All hedonic char-
acteristics for property have signicant and expected signs. Floor and Size have a statistically
positive signicant impact on the reserve price, that is, larger dwellings with more stories have
higher minimum prices. In contrast, an older dwelling has a low price. Proximity to a train
station is negatively associated with the reserve price. As expected, the larger the amount of
debt that the winner bears, the lower the reserve price. The coe¢ cient of Failure after has a
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smaller negative value than Failure before, implying that the district court lowers the reserve
price if properties fail to sell after the 1998 amendments. Interestingly, all the year dum-
mies have a statistically negative sign. This implies that the district court aggressively lowers
the reserve price to sell foreclosure properties. As expected, Short-term leasehold, Long-term
leasehold, and Third-party occupancy have a statistically signicant negative impact on the
reserve price. We also nd that the prices of properties with long-term leasehold are 24.32%
(exp( 0:2786) 1 =  0:2432) lower than the vacant properties, while the properties with short-
term leasehold are 7.8% (exp( 0:0813)   1 =  0:0781) lower than the vacant properties. As
expected, the prices of properties with long-term leasehold are much more discounted by the
district court. The prices of properties with third-party occupancy are 5.1% lower than those
of the vacant properties.
Table 5 reports the estimation results of the number of bidders. As mentioned in the previous
section, we believe that the land value proxies for the potential number of bidders. Therefore, a
positive sign of Value implies that the number of bidders increases when the number of potential
bidders increases. The 1998 year dummy has an insignicant negative sign, while the other year
dummies have a signicant positive sign. This implies that the 1998 amendment increases the
number of bidders. The results correspond to the gure shown in Section 2. We nd that
the reserve price has a statistically signicant positive impact on the number of bidders. A
good property with a high reserve price increases the private value of bidders, consequently
increasing the number of bidders. This implies that the number of bidders decreases when there
are occupants in properties, because all the tenure status dummies have negative impacts on
the reserve price. Using the coe¢ cient of Short-term leasehold in Table 4 and the coe¢ cient
of Reserve in Table 5, we nd that the number of bidders that participate in auctions of the
properties with short-term leasehold is 3.8% ( 0:24320:7870 =  0:0380) lower than for vacant
properties. In a similar fashion, we nd that the number of bidders that participate in auctions
of properties with long-term leasehold (third-party occupancy) is 11.85% (2.5%) lower than the
vacant properties.
Table 6 provides the estimation results of the auction price. All coe¢ cients are statistically
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signicant, except the constant term. Although the Corporation coe¢ cient is small, we nd that
Corporation is signicantly negative; leading to a lower selling price when joint-stock corpora-
tions are the highest bidder. We also nd that both the Reserve and the Number coe¢ cients are
positive. Properties with a higher reserve price and/or the larger the number of bidders tend to
be sold at higher prices. The positive coe¢ cient of Number implies that the 1998 amendments
of the foreclosure laws contribute to a rise in the auction price, because its increase the number
of bidders in judicial auctions.
From the above discussions, both the rst and the second e¤ects have an impact on the
auction price. First, the existence of occupants in the properties lowers the reserve price, and this
lowers the auction price. Second, the existence of occupants decreases the number of bidders,
and this further lowers the auction price. In total, the existence of short-term leaseholders
reduces the auction price by 7.9%, which is calculated as follows:
( 0:0781 0:9199)| {z }+
rst
( 0:0380 0:1832)| {z }
second
=  0:0788:
Similarly, the existence of long-term leaseholders (third-party occupants) reduces the auction
price by 24.54% (5.2%). Although the second e¤ect is weak, the existence of occupants has a
negative inuence in two ways. Occupants are costly people for bidders.
5 Conclusion
In Japan, foreclosure properties sold at judicial auctions are delivered to the buyer with unclear
title when occupants exist. This is because the foreclosure laws protect occupants from compul-
sory execution of auctions. Therefore, it is time-consuming and costly to evict occupants. This
paper investigated the e¤ect of these costly occupants on the auction price.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we developed a sealed-bid private model corresponding
to the Japanese judicial auction system. The model showed that costly occupants a¤ect the
resultant auction price through two channels. First, they a¤ect the reserve price, and this
changes the auction price. Second, the number of bidders changes in response to change in the
reserve price that is controlled by costly occupants, and this changes the auction price.
12
In the empirical part of the paper, we use data of auctions under the jurisdiction of the Osaka
District Court for the period 19972004. Our estimation model is formed by three equations:
the reserve price, the number of bidders, and the auction price. We sequentially estimate this
model using the GMM method, which overcomes the correlation among error terms of the three
equations. We use three dummy variables that capture the e¤ect of costly occupants: short-
term leasehold dummy, long-term leasehold dummy, and third-party occupancy dummy. All
these dummies imply that there are occupants in foreclosure properties. The empirical results
show that all dummies have a negative e¤ect on the auction price through reducing the reserve
price. All dummies also have a negative impact on the auction price through decreasing the
number of bidders, although this impact is weak. Among the three dummies, the long-term
leasehold dummy has the most negative e¤ect. We also nd that the 1998 amendments of the
foreclosure laws increase the number of bidders in judicial auctions, and consequently contribute
to a rise in the auction price.
In 2003, the foreclosure laws that protected occupants with a short-term leasehold were
abolished. Our empirical results suggest that these amendments will increase both the reserve
price and the number of bidders, consequently increasing the auction price. Therefore it will
enhance the e¢ ciency of the real estate market. Occupants with a long-term leasehold have
the most negative e¤ect on the auction market, and are still protected by the foreclosure laws.
Amendment of protection laws for long-term leasehold is also needed to increase the value of
properties.
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Figure 1. The e¤ect of the tenure status on the bidding price.
  
Table 1 
Definition of variables 
Variables Definition 
Reserve The reserve price in Japanese yen. 
Number The number of bidders in the auction. 
Price The winning bid in Japanese yen. 
Vacant A binary variable indicating property is vacant possession
position or occupied by a mortgagor (reference). 
Short-term leasehold A binary variable indicating property with a short-term lease. 
Long-term leasehold A binary variable indicating property with a long-term lease. 
Third-party occupancy A binary variable indicating property is occupied by a third 
party. 
Delinquency The amount of delinquency in Japanese yen. 
Failure before Number of times that a property fails to sell at auction before 1998. Auctions in 1997 and 1998 are included. 
Failure after Number of times that a property fails to sell at auction after 1998.
SRC A binary variable indicating a property whose main frames are 
made of steel-reinforced concrete. 
Others A binary variable indicating a property whose main frames are 
made of another construction material (reference). 
Floor Number of floors in the condominium. 
Size Floor size of a property in square meters. 
Age Age of property in years. 
Distance Distance to a nearby train station in meters. 
199# (200#) A binary variable indicating auction operates in 199# (200#). 
1997 is a reference year. 
Value The average assessed value of land in a ward where a 
condominium exists. Japanese yen per square meter. 
Individual A binary variable indicating the successful bid is by a private
person (reference). 
Corporation A binary variable indicating the successful bid is by a joint-stock 
corporation. 
 
  
Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Reserve price 8,382,795 5,241,847 720,000 64,050,000 
Number 7.2919 7.3232 1 99 
Price 11,078,112 7,357,561 788,000 109,000,000 
Vacant 0.7499 0.4331 0 1 
Short-term leasehold 0.1550 0.3620 0 1 
Long-term leasehold 0.0329 0.1784 0 1 
Third-party occupancy 0.0646 0.2458 0 1 
Delinquency 331,367 622,449 0 15,000,000 
Failure before 0.0775 0.4818 0 8 
Failure after 0.0366 0.2251 0 3 
SRC 0.6583 0.4744 0 1 
Others 0.3417 0.4744 0 1 
Floor 6.1841 3.8183 1 42 
Size 55.0898 22.6658 10.9400 385.4500 
Age 17.6924 6.4186 1.0000 37.0000 
Distance 5.9066 3.8431 0.0125 40.0000 
1997 0.1338 0.3405 0 1 
1998 0.1126 0.3161 0 1 
1999 0.1784 0.3829 0 1 
2000 0.1323 0.3388 0 1 
2001 0.1307 0.3372 0 1 
2002 0.1357 0.3425 0 1 
2003 0.1424 0.3495 0 1 
2004 0.0341 0.1816 0 1 
Value 349,766 76,462 199,455 549,571 
Individual 0.7121 0.4529 0 1 
Corporation 0.2879 0.4529 0 1 
     
Observations 3251 
 
  
Table 3 
Mean for dependent variables by type of occupancy 
 Observations Reserve Number Price 
8,382,795 7.2919 11,078,112 
All 3251 
[5,241,847] [7.3232] [7,357,561] 
8,862,434 7.5894 11,680,647 
Vacant 2430 
[5,350,999] [7.5353] [7,359,711] 
6,863,476 6.8988 9,118,119 
Short-term leasehold 504 
[4,780,401] [6.7476] [6,336,714] 
5,262,056 8.5421 7,449,381 
Long-term leasehold 107 
[2,642,838] [8.3443] [3,747,903] 
7,963,762 4.0000 10,498,554 
Third-party occupancy 210 
[4,722,634] [3.8214] [9,333,753] 
Note: Std. Dev is in squared brackets. 
  
Table 4 
Results for the reserve price 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. 
Short-term leasehold –0.0813 0.0136 
Long-term leasehold –0.2786 0.0264 
Third-party occupancy –0.0524 0.0191 
Delinquency –0.0060 0.0009 
Failure before –0.0616 0.0231 
Failure after –0.3162 0.0345 
SRC  0.0548 0.0100 
Floor 0.0552 0.0069 
Size 1.0113 0.0104 
Age –0.3722 0.0103 
Distance –0.0208 0.0057 
1998 –0.1341 0.0188 
1999 –0.2898 0.0171 
2000 –0.4280 0.0184 
2001 –0.4299 0.0186 
2002 –0.4899 0.0184 
2003 –0.5587 0.0184 
2004 –0.5214 0.0286 
Const. 13.1790 0.0543 
 
Adj. R-squared 0.8194 
Observations 3251 
  
Table 5 
Results for the number of bidders 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. 
Reserve 0.4874 0.0313 
Value 0.2078 0.0983 
1998 –0.0568 0.0626 
1999 0.2413 0.0578 
2000 0.7148 0.0654 
2001 0.6925 0.0664 
2002 0.9248 0.0674 
2003 1.1032 0.0725 
2004 1.3593 0.1020 
Const. –9.3738 1.3202 
 
Adj. R-squared 0.1158 
Observations 3251 
  
Table 6 
Results for the auction price 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. 
Reserve 0.9199 0.0053 
Number 0.1832 0.0058 
Value 0.1009 0.0130 
Corporation –0.0145 0.0053 
Const. –0.0274 0.1684 
 
Adj. R-squared 0.9450 
Observations 3251 
 
